Seminar details

Room 106 (1st floor, badged access)
25 November 2025 - 14h00
Electronic voting: design, attack, and formal verification
by Véronique Cortier from CNRS - LORIA
invited by David MONNIAUX


Abstract: Electronic voting aims at guaranteeing apparently conflicting
properties: no one should know how I voted and yet, I should be able to
check that my vote has been properly counted. Electronic voting belongs
to the large family of security protocols, that aim at securing
communications against powerful adversaries that may read, block, and
modify messages.
In this talk, we survey how voting protocols work through the example of
the French Legislative elections in 2022. We will then see
how to analyze them using formal methods and in particular ProVerif, in
order to detect attacks at an early stage, or prove security, yielding a
better understanding of the security guarantees and the threat model.



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