Jannik Dreier and Pascal Lafourcade and Yassine Lakhnech
Vote-Independence: A Powerful Privacy Notion for Voting Protocols (2011)
Vote-Independence: A Powerful Privacy Notion for Voting Protocols (2011)
TR-2011-8.pdf
Keywords: Electronic Voting, Privacy, Anonymity, Security, Formal Verification, Coercion-Resistance, Receipt-Freeness
Abstract: Recently an attack on ballot privacy in Helios has been discovered, which is essentially based on copying other voter's votes. To capture this and similar attacks, we extend the classical threat model and introduce a new security notion for voting protocols: Vote-Independence. We give a formal definition and analyze its relationship to established privacy properties such as Vote-Privacy, Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance. In particular we show that even Coercion-Resistant protocols do not necessarily ensure Vote-Independence.
