Supervised by: Cristian Ene, Laurent Mounier
Contacts:
- Cristian.EneATuniv-grenoble-alpes.fr
- Laurent.MounierATuniv-grenoble-alpes.fr
Verimag Lab
Keywords: software security, side channels, adaptive intruder model
Scientific Context
Measuring the information leakage of a system is very important for security. From side-channels to biases in random number generators, quantifying how much information a system leaks about its secret inputs is crucial for preventing adversaries from exploiting it.
The objective of this internship is to consider the case where the attacker is supposed to be both:
- active, i.e. it may interact with the target software to improve its knowledge;
- adaptive, i.e. it may take advantage of the partial observations/leakages gained after each interaction step to refine its attack strategy.
More details are provided in the document below.
