Grand Amphi, INRIA Rhône-Alpes, 38330 Montbonnot
7 October 2009 - 14h00
Attacking and Protecting Constrained Embedded Systems from Control Flow Attacks
by Aurélien Francillon from INRIA ALPES PLANETE TEAM
7 October 2009 - 14h00
Attacking and Protecting Constrained Embedded Systems from Control Flow Attacks
by Aurélien Francillon from INRIA ALPES PLANETE TEAM
Abstract: The security of low-end embedded systems became a very important topic
as they are more connected and pervasive. This thesis explores
software attacks in the context of embedded systems such as wireless
sensor networks. These devices usually employ a micro-controller with
very limited computing capabilities and memory availability, and a
large variety of architectures.
In the first part of this thesis we show the possibility of code
injection attacks on Harvard architecture devices, which was largely
believed to be infeasible.
Is the second part we describe attacks on existing software-based
attestation techniques. These techniques are used to detect
compromises of WSN Nodes. We propose a new method for software-based
attestation that is immune of the vulnerabilities in previous
protocols.
Finally, in the last part of this thesis we present a hardware-based
technique that modifies the memory layout to prevent control flow
attacks, and has a very low overhead.
Soutenance de Thèse
Composition du jury :
=====================
Pr. Andrzej Duda (Président du jury, INPG)
Pr. Jean-Louis Lanet (Rapporteur, Université de Limoges)
Pr. Peter Langendorfer (Rapporteur, IHP Microelectronics)
Pr. Levente Buttyan (Membre du jury, Budapest University)
Pr. Eric Filiol (Membre du jury, ESIEA)
Dr. Claude Castelluccia (Directeur de Thèse, INRIA)
