Maison Jean Kuntzmann
3 October 2014 - 14h00
Protocols and Models for the Security of Wireless Ad Hoc Networks (Phd Defense)
by Raphaël Jamet from Verimag
Abstract: Dear all,
It is a great pleasure to invite you to the defense of my PhD thesis
intitled
Protocols and Models for the Security of Wireless Ad Hoc Networks.
The defense will be held on the 3rd of October at 14:00, in French, in
Maison Jean Kuntzmann, on the campus of Grenoble. A map is available at
http://mi2s.imag.fr/plans-dacces .
You are all cordially invited to the pot de thèse that will happen
after in the same place.
Jury :
Dr. Marine Minier, Maître de Conférences at INSA Lyon, CITI (Reviewer)
Pr. Michel Misson, Professeur at IUT de Clermont Ferrand, LIMOS (Reviewer)
Pr. Abdelmadjid Bouabdallah, Professeur at UTC, Heudiasyc (Examiner)
Pr. Hervé Debar, Professeur at Telecom SudParis, Département RST (Examiner)
Dr. Marcelo Dias de Amorim, Directeur de Recherche at UPMC, LIP6 (Examiner)
Pr. Bernard Tourancheau, Professeur at Université de Grenoble, LIG (Examiner)
Dr. Pascal Lafourcade, Maitre de conférences at Université de Grenoble, VERIMAG (Supervisor)
Abstract :
In this document, we focus on ways of increasing the security of
wireless ad-hoc networks. These networks, and more specifically wireless
sensor networks, look increasingly like the right answer to a lot of
problem, such as data collection over a large area, or providing
emergency network infrastructure after a disaster. They are also
inherently exposed to malicious intents due to their collaborative
nature. In order to protect them, we focus on the security aspects of
the protocols built for these networks.
We first propose a Secure and Resilient Reputation-based Routing
protocol, called SR3. This protocol routes messages according to a
reputation metric built using only trusted information. This protocol
achieves data confidentiality and data packet unforgeability, which we
prove formally using two verification tools: CryptoVerif and Scyther. We
use Sinalgo, an event-driven network simulator to run an experimental
evaluation of SR3, and we compared our results to several routing
algorithms of the literature. This evaluation shows that both the
resiliency and fairness accomplished by SR3 are better than for those
others protocols, especially when the network is sparse. Moreover, and
unlike previous solutions, if the compromised nodes behavior changes,
then SR3 will self-adapt in order to ensure an acceptable quality of
service.
Analyses of routing protocols security are nearly always supported by
simulations, which often evaluate the ability to deliver messages to a
given destination. Several competing definitions for secure routing
exist, but to our knowledge, they only address source routing protocols.
We propose the notion of incorruptibility, a quantitative computational
definition for routing security based on the attacker's ability to alter
the routes used by messages. These definitions are then illustrated with
several routing algorithms.
Finally, we study Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for WANET, and more
specifically their inputs. These systems provide a supplementary layer
of defenses for WANETs, and they are able to easily detect attacks who
are complicated for the network protocols. We classify the different
inputs used by the decision process of these IDS, according to their
level of required cooperation, and the source of their data. We then
propose the InDICE tool, a decision aid which, given an IDS, allows
automated discovery of undetectable attacks according to the inputs used
by that IDS. In the end, we apply our framework to discover weaknesses
in two existing IDS.
