salle A. Turing CE4
25 March 2014 - 15h45
Lazart: a symbolic approach for evaluating the robustness of secured codes against control flow fault injections
by Laurent Mounier from VERIMAG
Abstract: In the domain of smart cards, secured devices must be protected against high level
attack potential. According to norms such as the Common Criteria,
the vulnerability analysis must cover the current state-of-the-art
in term of attacks.
Nowadays, a very classical type of attack is fault injection, conducted by means of laser based techniques.
We propose a global approach, called Lazart, to evaluate code robustness against fault injections targeting control flow modifications. The originality of Lazart is twofolds.
First, we encompass the evaluation process as a whole:
starting from a fault model, we produce (or establish the absence of) attacks, taking
into consideration software countermeasures.Furthermore, according to the near state-of-the-art,
our methodology takes into account multiple transient fault injections and their combination.
The proposed approach is supported by an effective tool suite based on the LLVM format
and the KLEE symbolic test generator.
