Seminar details

IMAG 206
12 April 2018 - 14h00
Cache-based attacks and spatial isolation countermeasure on multi and many-core architectures
by Maria Méndez Real from ATER IETR Nantes - équipe SYSCOM

Abstract: Logic Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) allow an attacker which has no physical access to the system to perform powerful attacks against sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Indeed, when a victim and an attacker processes share physical resources, the attacker is able to deduce sensitive information about the victim by monitoring its own performance, the victim execution time or memory access patterns, all influenced by the state of shared micro architecture components (e.g. Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities made public last January).In this talk we will focus on SCA seeing the cache as the source of leakage. Implementations in the literature have proved these attacks a real threat, able for instance to reveal cryptographic keys. Recently, they have been extended to Network-on-Chip multi/many-core systems. Existing solutions are not longer sufficient and need to be revisited or adapted to these recent technologies. In our research work, we propose to
> spatially isolate the execution of a sensitive application on a secure zone in order to prevent any cache sharing with this sensitive application. This generic system level countermeasure prevents attackers from analyzing the victim s cache activity, and consequently, to perform cache-based SCA. We have analyzed different strategies for the deployment and management of the secure zones in multi/many-core architectures. These countermeasures have been implemented through a virtual prototyping tool and have been evaluated and compared in terms of induced performance overhead.

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