Two's complement representation

hexadecimal



In case of wrap-around :

- signed : 255+1=0

- unsigned : 127+1=-128 and -128+1 = 127

Exercise 1- explanation

int offset, len ; // signed integers

/* first check that both offset and len are positives */

```
if (offset < 0 || len <= 0)
```

return -EINVAL;

...

/* if offset + len exceeds the MAXSIZE threshold, or in case of overflow,
 return an error code */

offset and len are both signed positive values and signed integer overflow is an undefined behavior

=> offset + len <0 is not expected to happen, this check is removed by the optimizer !

if ((offset + len > MAXSIZE) || (offset + len < 0)

return -EFBIG // offset + len does overflow

/* assume from now on that len + offset did not overflow ... */


offset + len can be a negative value ...

Exercise 1- possible corrections

1) See the corresponding CERT secure coding pattern

2) used unsigned integers(no undefined behaviors, always wrap-arround)

3) use compiler options to enfore wrap-aroud : -fno-strict-overflow and -f-wrapv



```
typedef struct {void (*f)(void);} st;
void nothing (){ printf("Nothing\n"); }
```

```
int main(int argc , char * argv [])
{ st *p1;
  char *p2;
  p1=(st*) malloc(sizeof(st));
  p1 ->f=& nothing;
  free(p1);
  p2=malloc(strlen(argv [1])); - p2 may point to the memory cell just freed
  strcpy(p2 ,argv [1]); -- this cell is initialized with a user input
  p1 ->f();
  return 0;}
```

=> arbitrary code execution ! (see next Lab)

Assigning pointers to NULL when they are freed ?

- Apply this solution to the previous example
- Explain why this solution may not work in case of compiler optimization
 - Assignment p1=null may be suppressed if p1 is not re-used (but one of its aliases is)
- Explain why this solution is not complete
 - Pointer aliases are not set to NULL
- Propose a more complete solution
 - Use a static alias detection analysis (pb : undecidable, overapproximation)
 - Runtime garbage collection (pb : efficiency issues?)

```
$userName = $_POST["user"];
$command = 'ls -l /home/' . $userName;
system($command);
```

Explain and correct the security weaknesses of this code ? Possible input: ;rm -rf /

Exercise 4 - correction

- Black listing : check for occurrences of dangerous characters (e.g, ; | &)
- White listing with a regular expression
 ^[a-z0-9_-]{3,15}\$
- https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/15 7426/what-is-the-regex-to-validate-linux-users

Exercise 4 - Example

```
static bool is_valid_name (const char *name)
{ /* * User/group names must match [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$] */
 if (('\0' == *name) | |
 !((('a' <= *name) && ('z' >= *name)) || ('_' == *name))) {
 return false:
}
while ('\0' != *++name) {
if (!(( ('a' <= *name) && ('z' >= *name) ) ||
  (('0' <= *name) && ('9' >= *name)) || ('_' == *name) ||
  ('-' == *name) || (('$' == *name) \&\& ('\0' == *(name + 1)))) 
  return false; } }
return true; }
```

(assuming the input size has been checked beforehand)

Exercise 5 question 1

- os.mkdir(*path*[, *mode*]) : Create a directory named *path* with numeric mode *mode*. The default *mode* is 0777 (octal). If the directory already exists, OSError is raised.
- Possible caveats:
 - mkdir is a potentialy dangerous operation
 - Defaults permissions are not necessarily known
 - 0777 gives very liberal permissions (drwxrwxrwx)

Exercise 5 question 2

What is the security issue in this code ?

def makeNewUserDir(username):
 if invalidUsername(username):
 #avoid CWE-22 and CWE-78
 print('Usernames cannot contain invalid characters')
 return False
try:
 raisePrivileges()
 os.mkdir('/home/' + username)
 lowerPrivileges()
except OSError:
 print('Unable to create new user directory for user:' + username)
 return False
return True

- May end with high priviledges set
- Beware of the permissions

Exercise 5 question 3

https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/732.html

function createUserDir(\$username){
 \$path = '/home/'.\$username;
 if(!mkdir(\$path)){ return false;}
 if(!chown(\$path,\$username)){rmdir(\$path); return false;}
 return true;}

- the directory is created with permissions 0777

- changing the owner does not change the rights (any user may still read/write/execute in the directory)

- no verification of the username

chown()

http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/7908799/xsh/chown.html
NAME
chown - change owner and group of a file
SYNOPSIS
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int chown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group);

RETURN VALUE

Upon successful completion, 0 is returned. Otherwise, -1 is returned and *errno* is set to indicate the error. If -1 is returned, no changes are made in the user ID and group ID of the file.

ERRORS

The *chown()* function will fail if:

[EACCES] Search permission is denied on a component of the path prefix.

[ELOOP] Too many symbolic links were encountered in resolving path.

[ENAMETOOLONG] The length of the *path* argument exceeds {PATH_MAX} or a pathname component is longer than {NAME_MAX}.

[ENOTDIR] A component of the path prefix is not a directory.

[ENOENT] A component of *path* does not name an existing file or *path* is an empty string.

[EPERM] The effective user ID does not match the owner of the file, or the calling process does not have appropriate privileges.

[EROFS] The named file resides on a read-only file system.

int get_and_verify_password(char *real_password) {
 int result;

```
char *user_password[64];
```

get_password_from_user_somehow(user_password, sizeof(user_password)); result = !strcmp(user_password, real_password);

```
memset(user_password, 0, strlen(user_password));
```

return result;

```
https://www.safaribooksonline.com/library/view/secure-programming-cookbook/0596003943/ch13s02.html
```

Declare password as *volatile*, encode memset operation by hand, use special functions like SecureZeroMemory() (on Windows)