

Software security, secure programming

Static Analysis (in a nutshell)

Master M2 Cybersecurity

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statically compute some information about (an approximation of) the program behavior

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- ▶ under-approximate the pgm behaviour
→ result is complete (no false negatives), but unsound (\exists false negative)
- ▶ non-terminating analysis
→ **if** the analysis terminates, **then** the result is sound and complete

What static analysis can be used for ?

General applications

- ▶ compiler optimization
e.g., active variables, available expressions, constant propagations, etc.
- ▶ program verification
e.g., invariant, post-conditions, etc.
- ▶ worst-case execution time computation
- ▶ parallelization
- ▶ etc.

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In the “software security” context

- ▶ **disassembling**
e.g., what are the targets of a dynamic jump
(`be eax, content of eax` ?)
- ▶ error and **vulnerability** detection
memory error (Null-pointer dereference, out-of-bound array access),
use-after-free, arithmetic overflow, etc.

Outline

Overview

Principles

Weakest Preconditions

Abstract Interpretation

Value-Set Analysis (VSA)

Conclusion

How to proceed ?

Typical problems

- ▶ need to reason on a set of executions (not on a single one)

ex: $x = y * z$

→ compute values of x for all possible values of y and z ?

- ▶ need to cope with loops

ex: `while (x < y) do ... end`

→ infer the loop behavior for all possible values of x and y ?

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A solution: over-approximate the program behavior

1. propagate an **abstract state** (over approximating the memory content)
e.g., $x > 0$, $p \neq \text{NULL}$, $x \leq y + z$, p and q are aliases, etc.
→ depends on the properties you want to check !
2. **safely** merge memory abstract states produced from \neq paths
3. make loop iterations **always finite**

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Pb: How to find a suitable abstract domains ?

→ accuracy vs scalability trade-offs ...

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A basic programming language

Syntax

Exp ::= $x \mid n \mid \text{op}(\text{Exp}, \dots \text{Exp})$
Stm ::= $x := \text{Exp}$
 ::= Stm ; Stm
 ::= skip
 ::= if Exp then Stm else Stm
 ::= while Exp do Stm end
 ::= assert Exp

In practice : arrays, structures, pointers, procedures, etc.

Axiomatic Semantics

⇒ programs viewed as *predicate transformers* where predicates are *assertions* on program variables (Hoare, Dijkstra 1976).

- ▶ **Weakest Preconditions (*wp*)** : backward computation

Example :

$$x \geq 0 \quad \{x := x + 1;\} \quad x > 0$$

- ▶ **Strongest Postcondition (*sp*)** : forward computation

Example :

$$x \geq 0 \quad \{x := x + 1;\} \quad x > 0$$

Weakest precondition / Strongest postcondition

Let I a statement, $P, R, ', R'$ some predicates

The weakest precondition $P = wp(I, R)$ is such that:

$$\forall P' (P' \Rightarrow wp(I, R)) \Rightarrow (P' \Rightarrow P)$$

A precondition P' stronger than $x \geq 0 : x > 5$.

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The strongest postcondition $R = sp(P, I)$ is such that:

$$\forall R' (sp(P, I) \Rightarrow R' \Rightarrow (R \Rightarrow R'))$$

A postcondition R' weaker than $x \geq 0 : x > -2$.

Substitution - free/bounded variables

Free and bounded variables

A variable x is **bounded** (resp. **free**) within formula F iff F contains an occurrence of x which **is** (resp. which **is not**) within the scope of a **quantifier**.

Example:

$$\varphi \equiv P(y, x) \wedge \forall x . Q(x, y)$$

\leftrightarrow there is both a free and a bounded occurrence of x in φ

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Substitution

$P[E/x]$ is the formula P in which all free occurrences of variable x have been replaced by the term E .

Example:

$$(\varphi[x + 1/x])[f/y] \equiv P(f, x + 1) \wedge \forall x . Q(x, f)$$

Computing weakest preconditions: basic instructions

Statement	<i>def.</i>	WP
$wp(\text{skip}, R)$	$\hat{=}$	R
$wp(x := e, R)$	$\hat{=}$	$R[e/x]$
$wp(i_1 ; i_2, R)$	$\hat{=}$	$wp(i_1, wp(i_2, R))$
$wp(\text{assert}(e), R)$	$\hat{=}$	$e \wedge R$

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Examples:

1. $wp(x := x + 1, x > 0)$
2. $wp(z := 2 ; y := z + 1 ; x := z + y, x \in 3..8)$

Another way to write WPs

R
skip;

$R[e/x]$
x := e;

$wp(i_1, wp(i_2, R))$
i₁;
 $wp(i_2, R)$
i₂;

$P \wedge R$
assert(**P**)

Example

$2 + 2 + 1 \in 3..8$

z:=2 ;

$z + z + 1 \in 3..8$

y:=z+1 ;

$z + y \in 3..8$

x:=z+y;

$x \in 3..8$

Computing weakest precondition: conditional statement

$$\begin{aligned} & wp(\text{if } P \text{ then } i_1 \text{ else } i_2 \text{ end, } R) \\ & \hat{=} (P \Rightarrow wp(i_1, R)) \wedge (\neg P \Rightarrow wp(i_2, R)) \end{aligned}$$

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Examples:

- ▶ Define $wp(\text{if } e \text{ then } i \text{ end}, R)$.
- ▶ What does the following program compute? Prove the result ...

```
begin
  if  $x > y$  then  $m := x$  else  $m := y$  end ;
  if  $z > m$  then  $m := z$  end
end
```

Solution (1)

$(x > y \Rightarrow F_1[x/m]) \wedge (\neg(x > y) \Rightarrow F_1[y/m]) = F_2$

if $x > y$

$F_1[x/m]$

 then $m := x$

$F_1[y/m]$

 else $m := y$ end ;

$(z > m \Rightarrow R_1[z/m]) \wedge (\neg(z > m) \Rightarrow R_1) = F_1$

if $z > m$

$R_1[z/m]$;

 then $m := z$

R_1 ;

 else skip ;

end

R_1

Solution (2)

Postcondition :

$$(m = x \vee m = y \vee m = z) \wedge m \geq x \wedge m \geq y \wedge m \geq z$$

Let's process $R_1 = m \geq x$.

Computing F_1 :

$$(z > m \Rightarrow m[z/m] \geq x) \wedge (\neg(z > m) \Rightarrow m \geq x)$$

which can be rewritten:

$$(z > m \Rightarrow z \geq x) \wedge (\neg(z > m) \Rightarrow m \geq x)$$

Solution (3)

Computing F_2 :

$$(x > y \Rightarrow F_1[x/m]) \wedge (\neg(x > y) \Rightarrow F_1[y/m])$$

leading to:

$$\begin{array}{llll} (x > y \wedge z > x) & \Rightarrow z \geq x) & \wedge \\ (x > y \wedge \neg(z > x)) & \Rightarrow x \geq x) & \wedge \\ (\neg(x > y) \wedge z > y) & \Rightarrow x \geq x) & \wedge \\ (\neg(x > y) \wedge \neg(z > y)) & \Rightarrow y \geq x) & \end{array}$$

Each of these 4 propositions is equivalent to **true**.

Computing weakest precondition: iteration

$$wp(\text{while } b \text{ do } S \text{ end}, R) ?$$

Partial correctness

→ compute the WP **assuming the loop will terminate**

- ▶ need to reason about an arbitrary number of iteration;
- ▶ find a **loop invariant** I such that:
 1. I is preserved by the loop body:

$$I \wedge b \Rightarrow wp(S, I)$$

2. if and when the loop terminates, the post-condition holds:

$$I \wedge \neg b \Rightarrow R$$

Then

$$wp(\text{while } b \text{ do } S \text{ end}, R) = I$$

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Total correctness: prove that the loop **do** terminate ...

need to introduce a loop **variant**

(i.e, a measure strictly decreasing at each iteration towards a limit).

Example

Prove the following program using WP

```
{x=n && n>0}
  y := 1 ;
  while x <> 1 do
    y := y*x ;
    x := x-1 ;
  end
{y=n! && n>0}
```


Implementing WP computation ?

1. WP computation:

- ▶ based on the program structure (Abstract Syntax Tree)

- ▶ leaves \rightsquigarrow root, following the instruction structure

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2. Decidability problems:

- ▶ simplification and proof of formula
undecidable in general, heuristics . . .

- ▶ invariant generation
undecidable in general, only specific invariant can be generated in some
restricted conditions (i.e., inductive invariants)

Accuracy vs Effectiveness trade-off

Assertion language

Theories	Complexity	Rappels
First order logic	undecidable	Interactive provers
Booleans	decidable	state enumeration
Intervals	quasi linear	approximation
Polyhedras	exponential	(better) approximation

Tools:

Frama-C/WP (proofs), Frama-C/Value (intervals), Polyspace (polyhedras) . . .

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A general framework : abstract interpretation

Although this theory has been invented here in Grenoble . . .

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. . . let's jump to Dillig's slides (from UT Austin, Texas) !

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Analysis example: Value-Set Analysis

Objective:

compute a (super)-set of possible values of each variable at each program location ...

$Env(x, l)$ = value set of variable x at program location l

Several possible **abstract domains** to express these sets:

- ▶ bounded value sets (k-sets)
ex: $Env(x, l) = \{0, 4, 9, 10\}$, $Env(y, l) = \{1\}$, $Env(z, l) = \top$
- ▶ intervals
ex: $Env(x, l) = [2, 8]$, $Env(y, l) = [-\infty, 7]$, $Env(z, l) = [-\infty, +\infty]$
- ▶ differential bounded matrix (DBM)
ex: $Env(l) = x - y < 10 \wedge z < 0$
- ▶ polyhedra (conjunction of linear equations)
ex: $Env(l) = x + y \geq 10 \wedge z < 0$
- ▶ etc.

VSA with intervals (example 1)

```
1. x := x+y ;  
if x>0 then  
    2. y:= x + 2  
else  
    3. y:= -x  
4. fi  
5. return x+y
```

Asuming (pre-condition) that:

$$x \in [-3, 3], y \in [-1, 5]$$

compute $Env(x, l)$ and $Env(y, l)$ for each program location l
what is the set of return values ?

Computing intervals on expressions

Syntax of expressions

$$e \rightarrow n \mid x \mid e + e \mid e \times e \mid \dots$$

Computation rules

$Val(e, Env)$ is the interval associated to e within Env

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$$Val(x, Env) = Env(x)$$

$$Val(e1 + e2, Env) = [a + c, b + d] \text{ where}$$

$$Val(e1, Env) = [a, b] \wedge Val(e2, Env) = [c, d]$$

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$$Val(e1 \times e2, Env) = [x, y] \text{ where}$$

$$Val(e1, Env) = [a, b] \wedge Val(e2, Env) = [c, d]$$

$$x = \min(a \times c, a \times d, b \times c, b \times d)$$

$$y = \max(a \times c, a \times d, b \times c, b \times d)$$

Intervals propagation

Propagation rules along the statement syntax:

- ▶ assignment

$$\{Env1\} \ x := e \ \{Env2\}$$

where

$$Env2(x) = Val(e, Env1) \wedge Env2(y) = Env1(x) \text{ for } y \neq x$$

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- ▶ sequence

$$\{Env1\} s1; s2 \{Env2\}$$

where

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where

$$\{Env1\} s1 \{Env3\} \wedge \{Env3\} s2 \{Env2\}$$

- ▶ conditionnal

$$\{Env\} \text{ if } (b) \text{ then } s1 \text{ else } s2 \{Env'\}$$

where

- ▶ $\{Env \cap Val(b, Env)\} s1 \{Env1\}$
- ▶ $\{Env \cap Val(\neg b, Env)\} s2 \{Env2\}$
- ▶ $Env' = Env1 \sqcup Env2$

($Env'(x)$ is the smallest interval containing $Env1(x)$ and $Env2(x)$, $\forall x$)

Iteration ? (example 1)

```
1. x := 0 ;  
while (x < 2) do  
  2. x := x+1  
3. end  
4. return x
```

compute $Env(x, l)$ for each program location l , where ...

$$Env(x, 2) = Env(x, 1) \sqcup Env(x, 3)$$

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compute $Env(x, l)$ for each program location l , where ...

$$Env(x, 2) = Env(x, 1) \sqcup Env(x, 3)$$

Actually, what we aim to compute is **the least solution** of function Env , i.e:

$$Env^0(\perp, l) \sqcup Env^1(\perp, l) \sqcup Env^2(\perp, l) \sqcup \dots \sqcup Env^k(\perp, l) \sqcup \dots$$

Iteration ? (example 2)

```
1. x := 0 ;  
while (x < 1000) do  
  2. x := x+1  
3. end  
4. return x
```

Compute $Env(x, l)$ for each program location $l \dots$

Iteration ? (example 2)

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Compute $Env(x, l)$ for each program location $l \dots$

What happens if we replace $x := x+1$ by $x := x-1$?

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Compute $Env(x, l)$ for each program location $l \dots$

What happens if we replace $x := x+1$ by $x := x-1$?

How to cope with such **looong**, or even **infinite**, computations ?

A practical solution : Widening & Narrowing operators

See Hakjoo Oh slides ...

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Challenges for static analysis

Accuracy vs scalability trade-off ...

- ▶ inter-procedural analysis (+ recursivity ...)
- ▶ multi-threading
- ▶ dynamic memory allocation
- ▶ modular reasoning
- ▶ libraries (+ legacy code)
- ▶ etc.

Application to vulnerability detection ?

Clearly may provide some useful features:

- ▶ out-of-bounds array access
- ▶ arithmetic overflows
- ▶ incorrect memory access (null pointer, mis-aligned address)
- ▶ use-after-free
- ▶ etc.

Application to vulnerability detection ?

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But still some limitations:

- ▶ exploitability analysis (beyond standard program semantics) ?
- ▶ relevant and accurate memory model (for heap and stack)
- ▶ self-modifying code (e.g., malwares)
- ▶ binary code analysis (see next slide !)

Static analysis on binary code

Static analysis relies on a (clear) program semantics

- ▶ can be done at the assembly-level (or IR)
- ▶ but disassembling is undecidable . . .
- ▶ . . . and disassemblers may rely on static analysis !
(to retrieve the program CFG)

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Static analysis on low-level code is difficult

- ▶ no types (a single type for value, addresses, data, code, ...)
- ▶ address computation is pervasive ...
 ex: `mov eax, [ecx + 42]`
- ▶ function bounds cannot always be retrieved
 → many un-initialized memory locations
- ▶ scalability issues
- ▶ etc.

What help for “security analysis” ?

“security analysis” = vulnerability detection

A pragmatic approach:

1. annotate the code with “vulnerability checks” (e.g., `frama-c -rte`)
i.e., assertions to detect integer overflows, invalid memory accesses (arrays, pointers), etc

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→ reveals a lot of **hot spots** (= unchecked assertions)

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e.g., function pre/post conditions, loop invariants, extra information ...
→ consider **proving** (some of) these assertions ?

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(false positive ? real bug but harmless w.r.t security ? real vulnerability ?)

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Rk: some static analysis tools also provide **bug finding** facilities
(i.e., no false positives, ... but false negatives instead)

Tool examples

Disclaimer: non limitative nor objective list ! (see wikipedia for more info)

Source-level tools

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- ▶ Coverity, **Polyspace**, CodeSonar, HP Fortify, VeraCode
- ▶ **Frama-C**, Fluctuat
- ▶ etc, etc, . . .

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Some binary-level tools

- ▶ x86-CodeSurfer
- ▶ VeraCode
- ▶ Angr
- ▶ **BinSec platform**
- ▶ etc ?

You can see also:

- ▶ the CERT webpages
- ▶ the Microsoft “Secure Development Lifecycle” ...