



Software security, secure programming

A brief introduction to Frama-C

Master M2 Cybersecurity, CSI & MoSiG

Academic Year 2018 - 2019

The Frama-C platform

An open-source collaborative platform for the analysis of C programs

<http://frama-c.com/index.html>

- ▶ developed by the CEA List and INRIA Saclay
- ▶ offers an integrated set of code analysis plug-ins:
 - ▶ **runtime-error detection (RTE)**
 - ▶ **value analysis (VSA)**
 - ▶ dependency analysis and slicing
 - ▶ control-flow-graph and call-graph computations
 - ▶ **property proof** using weakest preconditions computations (WP)
 - ▶ etc.

→ we are going to use essentially RTE, VSA, and (possibly) WP . . .

Some reminders about Value-Analysis¹

Goal: *statically* compute an (**over-approximated !**) set of values, for each variable, at each program location

Principle

Abstract Interpretation

- ▶ “compute” the program behavior using an **abstract semantics** (using abstract domains of values and abstract operations) as an iterative **fix-point computation**
- ▶ loop termination enforced/accelerated using widening & narrowing operators (over-approximate the loop behavior)

Outcomes

- ▶ help to detect potential runtime errors (arithmetic overflow, invalid memory access, etc.)
- ▶ may produce **false positives** (i.e., non existing bugs) when the over-approximation is too coarse

¹(see previous lectures for more details !)

Using Frama-C

Through its graphical user interface:

`frama-c-gui example.c` or, to produce **runtime error**

assertions: `frama-c-gui -rte -rte-all example.c` or, to

run **value analysis (VSA):** `frama-c-gui -val example.c`

Plugin Access also through the `Analyses` menu:

`Rtegen, Value analysis and WP`

A possible workflow (for each example):

1. Generate the runtime assertions (Rtegen)
→ verify that you understand them ...

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2. Run the value analysis

→ verify that you understand the results

Why some (obvious ?) assertions may not be validated ?

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3. If you think the code is incorrect/unsecure, try to strengthen it and goto 1

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A possible workflow (for each example):

1. Generate the runtime assertions (Rtegen)
→ verify that you understand them ...
2. Run the value analysis
→ verify that you understand the results
Why some (obvious ?) assertions may not be validated ?
3. If you think the code is incorrect/unsecure, try to strengthen it and goto 1
4. Otherwise, if you think the code is correct:
 - ▶ try to add some extra assertions (and loop invariants ?)
 - ▶ optionally, try to use `WP` to prove them ?
 - ▶ re-run the VSA with these new assertions ...

The assertion language ACSL

Ansi-C Specification Language

- ▶ first order logic
- ▶ use C types (int, float, pointers, arrays, etc.) + Z + R
- ▶ built-in predicates for memory access: `valid`, `separated`
→ allows to express memory-level requirements (beyond the C semantics)
- ▶ used as special comments:

```
/*@ ..... */
```

⇒ have a look to the short tutorial:

http://frama-c.com/acsl_tutorial_index.html

Example of assertion

- ▶ valid memory access:

`\valid(a)` means that address `a` refers to a memory location **correctly allocated** (w.r.t. the C type of `a`)

```
\valid(p)
\valid(t+i)
\valid(t+) (0..n-1)
```

- ▶ pre- and post- conditions

```
\requires x<= n && \valid(t+x)
\ensures (t+x) = x
```

- ▶ loop invariants, assertions

```
loop invariant z==x+y
assert x>=0
```

- ▶ etc.

The value analysis plug-in

(Evolved) Value Analysis

- ▶ Based on Abstract Interpretation to compute abstract variable domains
- ▶ Fully automated, but can be user-guided through ACSL annotations
- ▶ mainly used to discharge runtime-error assertions (RTE), but internally used by other plugins ...

Some practical informations

- ▶ abstract domains = value sets and intervals (**non relational domains**)
- ▶ controlling approximations (*time vs memory*)
 - ▶ syntactic loop unrolling (`-ulevel`)
 - ▶ semantic unrolling (`-slevel`)
 - **useful** when widening operators are **too coarse**
 - ▶ adding ACSL loop invariants, or extra assertions ...

Objective:

Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of static analysis tools (like Frama-C) for source-level vulnerability detection . . .

1. Play with the examples/exercices provided in the course web page . . .
2. You can also check if the vulnerabilities in the C files of Lab session 1 are detected by Frama-C ?