



# Two's complement representation


## hexadecimal



## unsigned



## signed



In case of wrap-around :

- signed :  $255+1=0$

- unsigned :  $127+1=-128$  and  $-128+1 = 127$

# Exercise 1- explanation

```
int offset, len ; // signed integers
```

```
...
```

```
/* first check that both offset and len are positives */
```

```
if (offset < 0 || len <= 0)
```

```
    return -EINVAL;
```

```
/* if offset + len exceeds the MAXSIZE threshold, or in case of overflow,
```

```
    return an error code */
```

**offset and len are both signed positive values and signed integer overflow is an undefined behavior**

**=> offset + len < 0 is not expected to happen, this check is removed by the optimizer !**

```
if ((offset + len > MAXSIZE) || (offset + len < 0))
```

```
    return -EFBIG // offset + len does overflow
```


```
/* assume from now on that len + offset did not overflow ... */
```

**offset + len can be a negative value ...**

# Exercise 1- possible corrections

- 1) See the corresponding [CERT secure coding pattern](#)
- 2) used unsigned integers  
(no undefined behaviors, always wrap-around)
- 3) use compiler options to enforce wrap-around :  
*-fno-strict-overflow* and *-f-wrapv*

# Exercise 2



# Exercise 3

```
typedef struct {void (*f)(void);} st;  
void nothing (){ printf("Nothing\n"); }
```

```
int main(int argc , char * argv [])
```

```
{ st *p1;
```

```
char *p2;
```

```
p1=(st*) malloc(sizeof(st));
```

```
p1 ->f=& nothing;
```

```
free(p1);
```

```
p2=malloc(strlen(argv [1]));
```

- p2 may point to the memory cell just freed

```
strcpy(p2 ,argv [1]);
```

-- this cell is initialized with a user input

```
p1 ->f();
```

```
return 0;}
```

**=> arbitrary code execution ! (see next Lab)**

# Assigning pointers to NULL when they are freed ?

- Apply this solution to the previous example
- Explain why this solution may not work in case of compiler optimization
  - Assignment `p1=null` may be suppressed if `p1` is not re-used (but one of its aliases is)
- Explain why this solution is not complete
  - Pointer aliases are not set to NULL
- Propose a more complete solution
  - Use a **static alias detection analysis** (pb : undecidable, over-approximation)
  - Runtime garbage collection (pb : efficiency issues?)

## Exercise 4

```
$userName = $_POST["user"];  
$command = 'ls -l /home/' . $userName;  
system($command);
```

Explain and correct the security weaknesses of this code ?

Possible input: **;  
rm -rf /**

=> assigns to \$command:

**ls -l /home/;  
rm -rf /**

# Exercise 4 - correction

- **Black listing** : check for occurrences of dangerous characters (e.g, ; | &)
- White listing with a regular expression
- `^[a-z0-9_-]{3,15}$`
- <https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/157426/what-is-the-regex-to-validate-linux-users>

## Exercise 4 - Example

```
static bool is_valid_name (const char * name)
{ /* * User/group names must match [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$] */
  if ((' ' == * name) ||
      !((( 'a' <= * name) && ('z' >= * name)) || ('_' == * name))) {
    return false;
  }
  while (' ' != *++name) {
    if (!((( 'a' <= * name) && ('z' >= * name) ) ||
          ( ('0' <= * name) && ('9' >= * name) ) || ('_' == * name) ||
          ('-' == * name) || ( ('$' == * name) && (' ' == *(name + 1)) ) )) {
      return false; } }
  return true; }
```

(assuming the input size has been checked beforehand)

# Exercise 5 question 1

- `os.mkdir(path[, mode])` : Create a directory named *path* with numeric mode *mode*. The default *mode* is 0777 (octal). If the directory already exists, `OSError` is raised.
- Possible caveats:
  - `mkdir` is a potentially dangerous operation
  - Defaults permissions are not necessarily known
  - 0777 gives very liberal permissions (**drwxrwxrwx**)

# Exercise 5 question 2

What is the security issue in this code ?

```
def makeNewUserDir(username):
    if invalidUsername(username):
        #avoid CWE-22 and CWE-78
        print('Usernames cannot contain invalid characters')
        return False
    try:
        raisePrivileges()
        os.mkdir('/home/' + username)
        lowerPrivileges()
    except OSError:
        print('Unable to create new user directory for user:' + username)
        return False
    return True
```

- May end with high priviledges set
- Beware of the permissions

# Exercise 5 question 3

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/732.html>

```
function createUserDir($username){  
    $path = '/home/'].$username;  
    if(!mkdir($path)){ return false;}  
    if(!chown($path,$username)){rmdir($path); return false;}  
    return true;}  
}
```

- the directory is created with permissions 0777
- changing the owner does not change the rights (any user may still read/write/execute in the directory)
- no verification of the username

# chown()

<http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/7908799/xsh/chown.html>

## NAME

chown - change owner and group of a file

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <sys/types.h>
```

```
#include <unistd.h>
```

```
int chown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group);
```

## RETURN VALUE

Upon successful completion, 0 is returned. Otherwise, -1 is returned and *errno* is set to indicate the error. If -1 is returned, no changes are made in the user ID and group ID of the file.

## ERRORS

The *chown()* function will fail if:

[EACCES] Search permission is denied on a component of the path prefix.

[ELOOP] Too many symbolic links were encountered in resolving *path*.

[ENAMETOOLONG] The length of the *path* argument exceeds {PATH\_MAX} or a pathname component is longer than {NAME\_MAX}.

[ENOTDIR] A component of the path prefix is not a directory.

[ENOENT] A component of *path* does not name an existing file or *path* is an empty string.

[EPERM] The effective user ID does not match the owner of the file, or the calling process does not have appropriate privileges.

[EROFS] The named file resides on a read-only file system.

# Exercise 6

```
int get_and_verify_password(char *real_password) {
    int result;
    char *user_password[64];
    get_password_from_user_somewhat(user_password, sizeof(user_password));
    result = !strcmp(user_password, real_password);
    memset(user_password, 0, strlen(user_password));
    return result;
}
```

<https://www.safaribooksonline.com/library/view/secure-programming-cookbook/0596003943/ch13s02.html>

Declare password as *volatile*, encode memset operation by hand, use special functions like SecureZeroMemory() (on Windows)