

## Security models: provable security

Time: 45'.

**Very important:**

- Exercises are independent.
  - Answer directly on the form; put your NAME and First name on the first page.
  - The mark will take into account quality of presentation.
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## Entropy and perfect secrecy

1. Let  $A, B, C$  be three random variables that verify:  $H((A, B)|C) = H(A) + H(B|C)$ .

What can be said about  $A, B$  and  $C$  – check the correct answer(s) – :

- Nothing (equality always verified)     
   $A, B$  are independent     
   $A, C$  are independent  
  $B, C$  are independent

2. A TripleDES key  $K$  contains 3 DES keys each with 8 bytes, so 24 bytes for  $K = [B_1, \dots, B_{24}]$ . Each byte  $B_i$  is built as follows: a random integer is uniformly chosen in  $\{0, \dots, 127\}$  which defines the 7 first bits of  $B_i$ ; the last bit of  $B_i$  is then the "xor" of its 7 first bits.

What is the entropy of the byte  $B_i$ ? **Answer:**

What is the entropy of  $K$ ? **Answer:**

3. Let  $n$  be an integer and  $G = \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ . Consider the cipher with secret key  $k \in G$  defined by:  $\forall x \in G : C_k(x) = x + k \pmod n$ .

1. How to encrypt with unconditional security a message of size  $m \gg \log_2 n$  bits using this cipher ?
2. What  $n$  is required to ensure unconditional security ?  any  $n > 1$     any large  $n$  (eg 2048 bits)  
 any large prime  $n$  (eg 2048 bits)    any  $n = pq$  with  $p$  and  $q$  1024-bit primes

## Complexity

4. On what problem(s) relies the security of the following protocols: (0.5 by correct answer, -0.5 by erroneous answer, bonus +0.5 for the three correct)

- RSA:  SUBSET-SUM (mod  $m$ )     $\text{LOG}_G$      $\text{PLOG}_G$   
 INTEGER-HAS-BIG-FACTOR    INTEGER-FACTORIZATION    QUADRATIC-RESIDUE
- Merkle-Hellman:  SUBSET-SUM (mod  $m$ )     $\text{LOG}_G$      $\text{PLOG}_G$   
 INTEGER-HAS-BIG-FACTOR    INTEGER-FACTORIZATION    QUADRATIC-RESIDUE
- El Gamal:  SUBSET-SUM (mod  $m$ )     $\text{LOG}_G$      $\text{PLOG}_G$   
 INTEGER-HAS-BIG-FACTOR    INTEGER-FACTORIZATION    QUADRATIC-RESIDUE

5. Briefly (but precisely) justify:

1.  $P \subset NP$ :
2.  $(P \neq co - NP) \iff (P \neq NP)$  :

6. Let  $Q$  be a problem that takes in input:  $\begin{cases} k : \text{an integer} \\ M \in \{0, 1\}^{n \times m} \text{ a matrix } n \times m \text{ with entries in } \mathbb{F}_2. \end{cases}$

1. What is the input size (in order) ?
2. What is the cost (in  $O$  notation) of a polynomial time algorithm ?

## Arithmetic and cryptography

7. Let  $p \geq 3$  be a prime integer and  $q = (p - 1)/2$ ; let  $\beta$  be a primitive element mod  $p$ . Prove that  $\beta^q = -1 \pmod p$ .

## Exercice hash function

Let  $h$  be a compression function  $\{0, 1\}^{k+r} \longrightarrow \{0, 1\}^r$ .

Let  $H$  be the hash function built from  $h$  by Merkle-Damgard iterative scheme.

8 (4 points).

1. Provide a brief drawing of Merkle-Damgard scheme.
2. What is the condition on  $h$  that ensures  $H$  to be resistant to collisions?

**Answer:**

How would you prove it? Just give the principle of the proof.

**Answer:**

3. Assume that a collision is known on  $H$ . How to generate many other collisions.

9. For a hash function with block size  $k = 1000$  bits and message digest  $r = 400$  bits, we consider the following padding of a message of  $m$  bits. Let  $l = \lceil \log_2 m \rceil$  and  $m = 2^l + \sum_0^{l-1} m_i 2^i$ . Let  $a = m \pmod{1000 - l}$  (note that  $a$  may be 0): the message is completed (as suffix) by a symbol "0" followed by  $1, m^{l-1}, \dots, m_0$ , in this order.

Is this padding secure ? (Justify briefly but precisely)

## Complexity

10. Let  $Q$  be a problem that takes in input:  $\begin{cases} k : \text{an integer} \\ B \in \{0, 1\}^n \text{ an array of } n \text{ bits.} \end{cases}$

1. What is the input size? [mark by X the correct answer]

$$\square \log k + \log n \quad \square k + \log n \quad \square n + \log k \quad \square n + k$$

2. Among the following complexities, which one(s) are polynomial in the input size of  $Q$  ?

$$\square O(\log^5 k \cdot \log^2 n) \quad \square O(k^5 \cdot \log^2 n) \quad \square O(n^5 \cdot \log^2 k) \quad \square O(n^5 \cdot k^2) \quad \square O(5^n \cdot k^2) \quad \square O(n^5 \cdot 2^k)$$