



## Software security, secure programming

### Lecture 5: Static Analysis (in a nutshell)

Master on Cybersecurity – Master MoSiG

Academic Year 2017 - 2018

# Static Analysis

## Main objective:

*statically compute some information about (an approximation of) the program behavior*

**Examples:** given (the source-code of) a program  $P$

- ▶ does **all executions** of  $P$  satisfy a property  $\varphi$  ?
- ▶ does  $\varphi$  satisfied at **a given (source) program location** ?

⇒ Of course, such questions are **undecidable** ... (why ?)

## Possible work-arounds:

- ▶ over-approximate the pgm behaviour  
→ result is sound (no false negatives), but incomplete ( $\exists$  false positives)
- ▶ under-approximate the pgm behaviour  
→ result is complete (no false negatives), but unsound ( $\exists$  false negative)
- ▶ non-terminating analysis  
→ **if** the analysis terminates, **then** the result is sound and complete

# What static analysis can be used for ?

## General applications

- ▶ compiler optimization  
e.g., active variables, available expressions, constant propagations, etc.
- ▶ program verification  
e.g., invariant, post-conditions, etc.
- ▶ worst-case execution time computation
- ▶ parallelization
- ▶ etc.

## In the “software security” context

- ▶ **disassembling**  
e.g., what are the targets of a dynamic jump  
(be `eax`, content of `eax` ?)
- ▶ error and **vulnerability** detection  
memory error (Null-pointer dereference, out-of-bound array access),  
use-after-free, arithmetic overflow, etc.

# How to proceed ?

## Typical problems

- ▶ need to reason on a set of executions (not on a single one)

ex:  $x = y * z$

→ compute values of  $x$  for all possible values of  $y$  and  $z$  ?

- ▶ need to cope with loops

ex: `while (x < y) do ... end`

→ infer the loop behavior for all possible values of  $x$  and  $y$  ?

## A solution: over-approximate the program behavior

1. propagate an **abstract state** (over approximating the memory content)

e.g.,  $x > 0$ ,  $p \neq NULL$ ,  $x \leq y + z$ ,  $p$  and  $q$  are aliases, etc.

→ depends on the properties you want to check !

2. **safely** merge memory abstract states produced from  $\neq$  paths
3. make loop iterations **always finite**

**Pb:** How to find a suitable abstract domains ?

→ accuracy vs scalability trade-offs ...

## A general framework : abstract interpretation

Although this theory has been invented here in Grenoble ...

... let's jump to Dillig's slides (from UT Austin, Texas) !

## Analysis example: Value-Set Analysis

### Objective:

compute a (super)-set of possible values of each variable at each program location ...

$Env(x, l)$  = value set of variable  $x$  at program location  $l$

Several possible **abstract domains** to express these sets:

- ▶ bounded value sets (k-sets)  
ex:  $Env(x, l) = \{0, 4, 9, 10\}$ ,  $Env(y, l) = \{1\}$ ,  $Env(z, l) = \top$
- ▶ intervals  
ex:  $Env(x, l) = [2, 8]$ ,  $Env(y, l) = [-\infty, 7]$ ,  $Env(z, l) = [-\infty, +\infty]$
- ▶ differential bounded matrix (DBM)  
ex:  $Env(l) = x - y < 10 \wedge z < 0$
- ▶ polyhedra (conjunction of linear equations)  
ex:  $Env(l) = x + y \geq 10 \wedge z < 0$
- ▶ etc.

## VSA with intervals (example 1)

```
1. x := x+y ;  
if x>0 then  
    2. y:= x + 2  
else  
    3. y:= -x  
4. fi  
5. return x+y
```

Asuming (pre-condition) that:

$$x \in [-3, 3], y \in [-1, 5]$$

compute  $Env(x, l)$  and  $Env(y, l)$  for each program location  $l$   
what is the set of return values ?

# Computing intervals on expressions

## Syntax of expressions

$$e \rightarrow n \mid x \mid e + e \mid e \times e \mid \dots$$

## Computation rules

$Val(e, Env)$  is the interval associated to  $e$  within  $Env$

$$Val(n, Env) = [n, n]$$

$$Val(x, Env) = Env(x)$$

$$Val(e1 + e2, Env) = [a + c, b + d] \text{ where}$$

$$Val(e1, Env) = [a, b] \wedge Val(e2, Env) = [c, d]$$

$$Val(e1 \times e2, Env) = [x, y] \text{ where}$$

$$Val(e1, Env) = [a, b] \wedge Val(e2, Env) = [c, d]$$

$$x = \min(a \times c, a \times d, b \times c, b \times d)$$

$$y = \max(a \times c, a \times d, b \times c, b \times d)$$



## Intervals propagation

Propagation rules along the statement syntax:

- ▶ assignment

$$\{Env1\} x := e \{Env2\} e$$

where

$$Env2(x) = Val(e, Env1) \wedge Env2(y) = Env1(y) \text{ for } y \neq x$$

- ▶ sequence

$$\{Env1\} s1; s2 \{Env2\}$$

where

$$\{Env1\} s1 \{Env3\} \wedge \{Env3\} s2 \{Env2\}$$

- ▶ conditionnal

$$\{Env\} \text{ if } (b) \text{ then } s1 \text{ else } s2 \{Env'\}$$

where

- ▶  $\{Env \cap Val(b, Env)\} s1 \{Env1\}$
- ▶  $\{Env \cap Val(\neg b, Env)\} s2 \{Env2\}$
- ▶  $Env' = Env1 \sqcup Env2$

( $Env'(x)$  is the smallest interval containing  $Env1(x)$  and  $Env2(x)$ ,  $\forall x$ )

## Iteration ? (example 1)

```
1. x := 0 ;  
while (x < 2) do  
  2. x := x+1  
3. end  
4. return x
```

compute  $Env(x, l)$  for each program location  $l \dots$

## Iteration ? (example 2)

```
1. x := 0 ;  
while (x < 1000) do  
  2. x := x+1  
3. end  
4. return x
```

Compute  $Env(x, l)$  for each program location  $l \dots$

What happen if  $x$  is initialized to 2000 instead of 0 ?

## Widening

For a lattice  $(E, \leq)$ , we define  $\nabla : E \times E \rightarrow E$

$\nabla$  is a (pair-)widening operator if and only if

### 1. Extrapolation:

$$\forall x, y \in E. x \leq x \nabla y \wedge y \leq x \nabla y$$

### 2. Enforce the convergence of $(X_n)_{n \geq 0}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} y_0 &= x_0 \\ y_{n+1} &= y_n \nabla x_{n+1} \end{aligned}$$

$(Y_n)_{n \geq 0}$  is ultimately stationary ...

→ open “unstable” bounds (jumping over the fix-point) !

## Widening on intervals

### Definition

$[a, b] \nabla [c, d] = [e, f]$  where,

- ▶  $e = \text{if } c < a \text{ then } -\infty \text{ else } a$
- ▶  $f = \text{if } b < d \text{ then } +\infty \text{ else } b$

### Examples

- ▶  $[2, 3] \nabla [1, 4] ?$
- ▶  $[1, 4] \nabla [2, 3] ?$
- ▶  $[1, 3] \nabla [2, 4] ?$

## Back to the previous example

```
1. x := 0 ;  
while (x < 1000) do  
  2. x := x+1  
3. end  
4. return x
```

$$Env(x, 2)_{n+1} = Env(x, 2)_n \nabla (Env(x, 1)_n \sqcup Env(x, 3)_n)$$

$$Env(x, 2)_1 = [0, 0]$$

$$Env(x, 2)_2 = [0, 1]$$

$$Env(x, 2)_3 = [0, +\infty]$$

→ stable solution ... but not precise enough ?

$$Env(x, 3)_3 = [1000, +\infty]$$

## Narrowing

lattice  $(E, \leq)$ ,  $\Delta : E \times E \rightarrow E$

$\Delta$  is a (pair-)narrowing operator if and only if

1. (abstract) intersection

$$\forall x, y \in E. x \cap y \leq x \Delta y$$

2. Enforce the convergence of  $(X_n)_{n \geq 0}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} y_0 &= x_0 \\ y_{n+1} &= y_n \Delta x_{n+1} \end{aligned}$$

$(Y_n)_{n \geq 0}$  is ultimately stationary ...

→ refines open bounds !

## Narrowing on intervals

$[a, b] \triangle [c, d] = [e, f]$  where,

- ▶  $e =$  if  $a = -\infty$  then  $c$  else  $a$
- ▶  $f =$  if  $b = +\infty$  then  $d$  else  $b$

### Examples

- ▶  $[2, 3] \triangle [1, +\infty]$  ?
- ▶  $[1, 4] \triangle [-\infty, 3]$  ?
- ▶  $[1, 3] \triangle [+ \infty, -\infty]$  ?



## Back (again !) to the previous example

```
1. x := 0 ;  
while (x < 1000) do  
  2. x := x+1  
3. end  
4. return x
```

$$Env(x, 2)_{n+1} = Env(x, 2)_n \triangle (Env(x, 1)_n \cup Env(x, 3)_n)$$

$$Env(x, 2)_1 = [0, +\infty]$$

$$Env(x, 2)_2 = [0, 1000]$$

→ stable solution ...

$$Env(x, 3)_2 = [1000, 1000]$$

# Challenges for static analysis

Accuracy vs scalability trade-off ...

- ▶ inter-procedural analysis (+ recursivity ...)
- ▶ multi-threading
- ▶ dynamic memory allocation
- ▶ modular reasoning
- ▶ libraries (+ legacy code)
- ▶ etc.

## Application to vulnerability detection ?

Clearly may provide some useful features:

- ▶ out-of-bounds array access
- ▶ arithmetic overflows
- ▶ incorrect memory access (null pointer, mis-aligned address)
- ▶ use-after-free
- ▶ etc.

But still some limitations:

- ▶ exploitability analysis (beyond standard program semantics) ?
- ▶ relevant and accurate memory model (for heap and stack)
- ▶ self-modifying code (e.g., malwares)
- ▶ binary code analysis (see next slide !)

**Rk:** some useful information on the CERT webpages ...

## Static analysis on binary code

### Static analysis relies on a (clear) program semantics

- ▶ can be done at the assembly-level (or IR)
- ▶ but disassembling is undecidable ...
- ▶ ... and disassemblers may rely on static analysis !  
(to retrieve the program CFG)

### Static analysis on low-level code is difficult

- ▶ no types (a single type for value, addresses, data, code, ...)
- ▶ address computation is pervasive ...  
    ex: `mov eax, [ecx + 42]`
- ▶ function bounds cannot always be retrieved  
    → many un-initialized memory locations
- ▶ scalability issues
- ▶ etc.

# Tool examples

Disclaimer: non limitative nor objective list ! (see wikipedia for more info)

## Source-level tools

- ▶ Astrèe
- ▶ Coverity, Polyspace, CodeSonar, HP Fortify, VeraCode
- ▶ **Frama-C**, Fluctuat
- ▶ etc, etc, ...

## Some binary-level tools

- ▶ x86-CodeSurfer
- ▶ VeraCode
- ▶ Angr
- ▶ **BinSec platform**
- ▶ etc ?