



## Software security, secure programming

Lecture 4: an overview of Software Security Analysis Techniques

Master on Cybersecurity - Master MoSiG

Academic Year 2017 - 2018

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### "function correctly"?

- no crash (!), no disclosure/erasure of confidential data
- no bypass of security policy rules
- no deviation from intended behavior (arbitrary code execution)
- $\rightarrow$  what the SW should **not** do ...

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#### "malicious attacks"?

Well-crafted attack vectors, based on knowledge about:

- execution platform: libraries, OS/HW protections
- target software: code, patches
- up-to-date vulnerabilities and exploit techniques
- → much beyond unexpected input/execution conditions

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secure software ≠ robust/safe/fault-tolerant software

#### Root causes of insecure softwares

- "A software flaw that may become a security threat ..."
- ≠ kinds of bugs w.r.t security:
  - ▶ harmless: only leads to incorrect results or "simple" crash
  - exploitable: can lead to unsecure behaviors . . .

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### Examples of exploitable vulnerabilities

(combinations of:)

- invalid memory accesses: buffer overflow, dangling pointers
- arithmetic overflows
- race conditions
- unsecure coding patterns (lack of input sanitization, etc.)
- etc.

**Rk:** influence of programming language, compilation tool, execution environment (plateform, OS, users ...)

# Vulnerability detection and analysis

### A major security concern ...

- ▶ 5000 vulns in 2011, 5200 in 2012, 6700 in 2013 ... [Symantec]
- applications and OS editors, security agencies, defense departments, IT companies, . . .

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#### ... and a business!

Some 0-day selling prices: see Zerodium web site . . .

### Two distinct problems

- 1. detection: identify (security related) bugs
- 2. analysis: evaluate their dangerousness
  Are they exploitable? How difficult is it? Which consequences?

## The current "industrial" practice

### A 2-phase approach

- (pseudo-random) fuzzing, fuzzing, and fuzzing . . .

   → to produce a huge number of program crashes
- in-depth *manual* crash analysis

   → to identify exploitable bugs and obtain PoC exploits (ignoring protections)

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#### **Drawbacks**

- A time consuming activity (very small ratio "exploitable flaws/simple bugs"!)
   100,000 open bugs for Linux Ubuntu; 8000 for Firefox
- Would require a better tool assistance ...
   (e.g., "smart" disassembler, trace analysis, debuggers ?)

example: crash of /bin/make on Linux ...

#### The "academic" research trends

### Re-use and adapt validation oriented code analysis techniques

- static analysis, bounded model-checking
- test generation: symbolic/concolic execution, genetic algos, etc.
- dynamic (trace based) analysis

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### security analysis $\neq$ safety analysis!

- should be carried on the executable code
- ▶ exploit analysis ⇒ beyond source-level semantics (understand what can happen after an undefined behavior)

Main issue: scalability!...

DARPA CGC: software security tool competition (1st prize: \$2,000.000)

## Outline

Checking Software Security

Outline of the next part of the course on this topic

Oral presentations

## Some security-oriented code analysis techniques

- Fuzzing how to make a program crash?
- Dynamic Analysis collect (more) useful information at runtime
- (Dynamic) Symbolic Execution (DSE)
   explore a (comprehensive) subset of the execution sequences
- Static Analysis and Abstract Interpretation analyse an approximation of the code behaviour without executing it

And, in addition, an overview of:

- stronger fault models (e.g., fault injection)
- some specific language/plateform issues (e.g., Java, Android, ...)

# Course organization

lectures

paper exercises

► lab sessions (on tools) static analysis, DSE, fuzzing, ...

oral presentations

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## Suggested topics (a non limitative list!)

- - Java JVM / Android / . . .
  - ► Golang, ...
  - ► JavaScript / PhP . . .
  - **.** . . .
- Protections
  - ► Control-Flow Integrity (CFI)
  - ► Windows 10 protections
- Malwares principles, detection and identification techniques
- Code (de)-obfuscation techniques
- Vulnerability exploitation techniques
   Return-Oriented-Programming (ROP), defeating ASLR, etc.
- Side-channel attacks
- **>**

## Organisation

One oral presentation per "binôme" (team of 2 students)

#### schedule:

- before Dec. the 7th choose your subject (and binôme)
  - $\rightarrow$  sent it to me by e-mail!
- ► [11th of January]

#### oral presentations

- ▶ 15 mn. presentation per binômes (with slides)
- ► a written report (3-5 pages)