



# Software security, secure programming (and computer forensics)

## Lecture 1: introduction

Master on Cybersecurity – Master MoSiG (HECS & AISSE)

Academic Year 2016 - 2017

# Who are we ?

## Teaching staff

- ▶ Laurent Mounier (UGA) & Marie-Laure Potet (Grenoble-INP)
- ▶ research within Verimag Lab (PACSS team)
- ▶ research focus: formal verification, code analysis, compilation techniques, language semantics ... and **(software) security** !

## Attendees

- ▶ Master M2 on Cybersecurity
- ▶ Master MoSiG: HECS (mandatory) & AISSE (optionnal)

→ various skills, background and interests ...

# Agenda

## Part 1: an overview of software security and secure programming

- ▶ 6 weeks (18 hours)
- ▶ for all of you ...
- ▶ class on **tuesday** (11.30am-1pm) and **wednesday** (2pm-3.30pm)  
→ includes lectures, exercises and *lab sessions* ...

## Part 2: a deeper dive into software security ...

- ▶ 7 weeks (21 hours)
- ▶ for M2 Cyberscurity students only
- ▶ detailed organization to be defined ...

# Examination rules

The rules of the game ...

## Assignments

- ▶  $M_1$ : a written exam (duration=1.5h, end of October)
- ▶  $M_2$ : a (short) report on lab sessions
- ▶  $M_3$ : an oral presentation (in November)
- ▶  $M_4$ : final written exam (duration=3h, end of January)

## Mark computation (3 ECTS)

- ▶ for MoSiG students:

$$M = (0.3 \times M_2) + (0.7 \times M_1)$$

- ▶ for Cybersecurity students:

$$M = (0.3 \times (M_1 + M_3)/2) + (0.2 \times M_2) + (0.5 \times M_4)$$

## Course user manual

### An (on-going) course web page ...

`http://www-verimag.imag.fr/~mounier/Enseignement/Software\_Security`

- ▶ course schedule and materials (slides, etc.)
- ▶ weekly, reading suggestions, to complete the lecture
- ▶ other background reading/browsing advices ...

### During the classes ...

Alternation between lectures, written exercises, lab exercises ...

...but no “formal” lectures → questions & discussions always welcome !

heterogeneous audience + open topics ⇒ **high interactivity level !**

# Prerequisites

Ideally ...

This course is concerned with:

## Programming languages

- ▶ at least one (classical) imperative language:  
C or C++ ? Java ?? Python ??? ...
- ▶ a bit of web: web application architecture ? JavaScript ??
- ▶ some notions on compilation ? on language semantics ??

## What happens behind the curtain

Some notions about:

- ▶ assembly code (ARM, x86, others ...)
- ▶ memory organization (stack, heap)
- ▶ hardware architecture

# Outline

Some practical information

What **software security** is (not) about ?

About software security

# The context: computer system security ...

## Question 1: what is a **computer system** ?

Many possible appearances, e.g.:

- ▶ (classical) computer: mainframe, server, desktop
- ▶ mobile device: phone, tablets, audio/video player, etc.  
... up to IoT, smart cards, ...
- ▶ embedded (networked) systems: inside a car, a plane, a washing-machine, etc.
- ▶ clouds
- ▶ but also industrial networks (Scada), ... etc.
- ▶ and certainly many more !

→ 2 main interesting characteristics:

- ▶ includes hardware + **software**
- ▶ open/connected to the **outside world** ...



## The context: computer system security ... (ct'd)

### Question 2: what does mean **security** ?

↪ Many (many) possible definitions ...

- ▶ a set of “high-level” **security** goals:  
CIA = Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (+ Non Repudiation + ...)

- ▶ is it specific to the computer system we consider ?  
how to deal with “unsecure executions” ?

- ▶ something beyond **safety** and **fault-tolerance**:

- ▶ notion of **intruder**, with specific capabilities
- ▶ notion of **threats**, with a “threat model”

→ there is an “external actor” with an attack objective in mind, and able to elaborate a dedicated strategy to achieve it ( $\neq$  hazards)

- ▶ a definition “by default”:

- ▶ fonctional properties = what the system should do
- ▶ security properties =  
what the system should **not do**  
how it should **not behave**

## Software security: an example

Let us consider 2 programs:

- ▶ `Compress`, to compress a file  $f$
- ▶ `Uncompress`, to uncompress a (compressed) file  $c$

Expected behavior: **the one we will try to validate !**

$$\text{Uncompress}(\text{Compress}(f)) = f \quad (1)$$

But, what about uncompressing an arbitrary (*i.e.*, *maliciously crafted*) file ?  
(e.g., CVE-2010-0001 for `gzip`)

$$(\forall f. \text{Compress}(f) \neq c) \Rightarrow (\text{Uncompress}(c) = \text{"Error\_Msg"}) \quad (2)$$

Actually (2) is **much more difficult to validate** than (1) ...

**Demo:** `make`

## But, what about **software** security ?

Software is **greatly involved** in “computer system security”:

- ▶ it plays a major role in **enforcing security properties**:  
crypto, authentication protocols, intrusion detection, firewall, etc.
- ▶ but it is also a major source of **security problems** . . .

→ SW is clearly one of the **weakest links** in the security chain!

### Why ???

- ▶ we do not do very well how to write **secure** SW  
we do not even know how to write **correct** SW!
- ▶ behavioral properties can't be validated on a (large) SW  
impossible by hand, untractable with a machine
- ▶ programming languages not designed for security enforcement  
most of them contain numerous traps and pitfalls
- ▶ programmers feel not (so much) concerned with security  
security not get enough attention in programming/SE courses
- ▶ heterogenous and nomad applications favor unsecure SW  
remote execution, mobile code, plugins, reflection, etc.
- ▶ etc.

## Some evidences regarding software (un)-security

So many examples of successful computer system attacks:

- ▶ the “famous ones”: (at least one per year !)  
Morris worm, Slammer worm, Stuxnet, Heartbleed, etc.
- ▶ the “cyber-attacks” against large organizations: (+ 400% in 10 years)  
Sony, Yahoo, Paypal, e-Bay, etc.
- ▶ all the daily vulnerability alerts: [have a look at these sites !]  
`http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas`  
`http://www.securityfocus.com`  
`http://www.securitytracker.com`

→ **Need to distinguish between:**

- ▶ **security related** piece of code uncorrectly **specified/implemented** (crypto function, IDS, passwd manager, etc.)
- ▶ **programming bugs** in **general purpose** code (¬ security related)  
↪ **clearly the most frequent situation !**

## Some evidences regarding software (un)-security (ct'd)

An increasing activity in the “defender side” as well ...

- ▶ all the daily security patches (for OS, basic applications, etc.)
- ▶ companies and experts specialized in software security  
code audit, search for 0days, malware detection & analysis, etc.  
“bug bounties” [see Zerodium slide]
- ▶ some important research efforts  
from the main software editors (e.g., MicroSoft, Google, etc)  
from the academic community (numerous dedicated conferences)  
from independent “ethical hackers” (blogs, etc.)
- ▶ software verification tools editors start addressing security issues  
e.g.: dedicated static analyser features
- ▶ international cooperation for vulnerability disclosure and classification  
e.g.: CERT, CVE/CWE catalogue, vulnerability databases
- ▶ government agencies to promote & control SW security  
e.g.: ANSSI, Darpa “Grand Challenge”, etc.

# Outline

Some practical information

What **software security** is (not) about ?

About software security

## Some (not standardized) definitions . . .

**Bug:** an error (or defect/flaw/failure) introduced in a SW, either

- ▶ the specification / design / algorithmic level
- ▶ the programming / coding level
- ▶ or even by the compiler (or other pgm transformation tools) . . .

**Vulnerability:** a bug that opens a security breach

- ▶ **non exploitable** vulnerabilities: there is no (known !) way for an attacker to use this bug to corrupt the system
- ▶ **exploitable** vulnerabilities: this bug can be used to elaborate an attack (i.e., write an exploit)

**Exploit:** a concrete program input allowing to *exploit* a vulnerability (from an attacker point of view !)

**PoC exploit:** assumes that existing protections are disabled (i.e., they can be hijacked with other existing exploits)

**Malware:** a piece of code “injected” inside a computer to corrupt it  
→ they usually exploit existing vulnerabilities

## Couter-measures and protections (examples)

Several existing mechanisms to **enforce** SW security

- ▶ at the programming level:
  - ▶ disclosed vulnerabilities → language weaknesses databases  
↳ *secure* coding patterns and libraries
  - ▶ aggressive compiler options + code instrumentation  
↳ early detection of unsecure code
  
- ▶ at the OS level:
  - ▶ sandboxing
  - ▶ address space randomization
  - ▶ non executable memory zones
  - ▶ etc.
  
- ▶ at the hardware level:
  - ▶ Trusted Platform Modules (TPM)
  - ▶ secure crypto-processor
  - ▶ CPU tracking mechanisms (e.g., Intel Processor Trace)
  - ▶ etc.



# Techniques and tools for assessing SW security

Several existing mechanisms to **evaluate** SW security

- ▶ **code review** ...
- ▶ **fuzzing**:
  - ▶ run the code with “unexpected” inputs → **pgm crashes**
  - ▶ (tedious) manual check to find **exploitable** vulns ...
- ▶ **(smart) testing**:  
coverage-oriented pgm exploration techniques  
(genetic algorithms, dynamic-symbolic executions, etc.)  
+ code instrumentation to detect (low-level) vulnerabilities
- ▶ **static analysis**: approximate the code behavior to detect **potential** vulns  
(~ code optimization techniques)

## In practice:

- ▶ only **the binary code** is **available** and **useful** ...
- ▶ **combinations** of all these techniques ...
- ▶ **exploitability analysis** still a challenging ...

## Course objectives (for the part 1)

- ▶ Understand the causes of common weaknesses in SW security
  - ▶ at the programming language level
  - ▶ at the execution platform level
  
- ▶ Learn some methods and techniques to build more secure SW:
  - ▶ programming techniques:  
languages, coding patterns, etc.
  - ▶ validation techniques:  
what can(not) bring existing tools ?
  - ▶ counter-measures and protection mechanisms

## Course agenda (part 1)

See

[http://www-verimag.imag.fr/~mounier/Enseignement/Software\\_Security](http://www-verimag.imag.fr/~mounier/Enseignement/Software_Security)

## Credits:

- ▶ E. Poll (Radboud University)
- ▶ M. Payer (Purdue University)
- ▶ E. Jaeger, O. Levillain and P. Chifflier (ANSSI)