

Software Security: Vulnerability Analysis

Finding Bugs/Vulnerabilities

- Attackers:
 - Find vulnerabilities
 - Weaponize them (exploit the vulnerabilities)
 - Use exploits to compromise machines & systems
 - Exploits are worth money



Market for 0days

- Sell for \$10K-1M



0day **0day Market**

@0daybid

This is the place where you can buy unpatched and undisclosed vulnerabilities.



eEye Digital Security®


BreakingPoint
Find it before they do.™

iDEFENSE
A VeriSign Company



Finding Bugs/Vulnerabilities


- Defenders:
 - Find vulnerabilities & eliminate them
 - Improve security of software
 - Easier and cheaper to fix a vulnerability before software deployed
 - After deployed: patching is expensive
 - Ideally prove a program is free of vulnerabilities



Example: Static Device Verifier

- Verifies that drivers are not making illegal function calls or causing system corruption
 - SLAM project at Microsoft
 - <http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/slam>
- “The requirements for the Windows logo program (*now Windows Hardware Certification Program*) state that a driver must not fail while running under Driver Verifier.”

Techniques & Approaches



Fuzzing

Finding bugs in PDF viewer

PDF viewer




?

Black-box Fuzz Testing

- Given a program, simply feed it random inputs, see whether it crashes
- Advantage: really easy
- Disadvantage: inefficient
 - Input often requires structures, random inputs are likely to be malformed
 - Inputs that would trigger a crash is a very small fraction, probability of getting lucky may be very low

Fuzzing

- Automatically generate test cases
- Many slightly anomalous test cases are input into a target
- Application is monitored for errors
- Inputs are generally either file based (.pdf, .png, .wav, .mpg)
- Or network based...
 - http, SNMP, SOAP




Regression vs. Fuzzing

	Regression	Fuzzing
Definition	Run program on many normal inputs, look for badness.	Run program on many abnormal inputs, look for badness.
Goals	Prevent normal users from encountering errors (e.g. assertion failures are bad).	Prevent attackers from encountering exploitable errors (e.g. assertion failures are often ok).

Enhancement I: Mutation-Based Fuzzing





- Take a well-formed input, randomly perturb (flipping bit, etc.)
- Little or no knowledge of the structure of the inputs is assumed
- Anomalies are added to existing valid inputs
- Anomalies may be completely random or follow some heuristics (e.g. remove NUL, shift character forward)
- Examples:
 - E.g., ZZUF, very successful at finding bugs in many real-world programs, <http://sam.zoy.org/zzuf/>
 - Taof, GPF, ProxyFuzz, FileFuzz, Filep, etc.



Example: fuzzing a pdf viewer


- Google for .pdf (about 1 billion results)
- Crawl pages to build a corpus
- Use fuzzing tool (or script)
 1. Grab a file
 2. Mutate that file
 3. Feed it to the program
 4. Record if it crashed (and input that crashed it)

Mutation-based Fuzzing In Short

Mutation-based	Super easy to setup and automate 	Little to no protocol knowledge required 	Limited by initial corpus 	May fail for protocols with checksums, those which depend on challenge 

Enhancement II: Generation-Based Fuzzing

- Test cases are generated from some description of the format: RFC, documentation, etc.
 - Using specified protocols/file format info
 - E.g., SPIKE by Immunity
<http://www.immunitysec.com/resources-freesoftware.shtml>
- Anomalies are added to each possible spot in the inputs
- Knowledge of protocol should give better results than random fuzzing











Example: Protocol Description

```
//png.spk
//author: Charlie Miller

// Header - fixed.
s_binary("89504E470D0A1A0A");

// IHDRChunk
s_binary_block_size_word_bigendian("IHDR"); //size of data field
s_block_start("IHDRcrc");
    s_string("IHDR"); // type
    s_block_start("IHDR");
// The following becomes s_int_variable for variable stuff
// 1=BINARYBIGENDIAN, 3=ONEBYE
    s_push_int(0x1a, 1); // Width
    s_push_int(0x14, 1); // Height
    s_push_int(0x8, 3); // Bit Depth - should be 1,2,4,8,16, based on colortype
    s_push_int(0x3, 3); // ColorType - should be 0,2,3,4,6
    s_binary("00 00"); // Compression || Filter - shall be 00 00
    s_push_int(0x0, 3); // Interlace - should be 0,1
    s_block_end("IHDR");
s_binary_block_crc_word_littleendian("IHDRcrc"); // crc of type and data
s_block_end("IHDRcrc");
...
```


Generation-Based Fuzzing In Short

Mutation-based	Super easy to setup and automate 	Little to no protocol knowledge required 	Limited by initial corpus 	May fail for protocols with checksums, those which depend on  challenge
Generation-based	Writing generator can be labor intensive for complex protocols 	Have to have spec of protocol (Often can find good tools for existing protocols e.g. http, SNMP) 	Completeness 	Can deal with complex dependencies e.g. checksums 

Fuzzing Tools & Frameworks



Input generation




Input injection



Bug detection


Input Generation

- Existing generational fuzzers for common protocols (ftp, http, SNMP, etc.)
 - Mu Dynamics, Codenomicon, PROTOS, FTPFuzz, WebScarab
- Fuzzing Frameworks: providing a fuzz set with a given spec
 - SPIKE, Peach, Sulley
- Mutation-based fuzzers
 - Taof, GPF, ProxyFuzz, PeachShark
- Special purpose fuzzers
 - ActiveX (AxMan), regular expressions, etc.



Input Injection

- Simplest
 - Run program on fuzzed file
 - Replay fuzzed packet trace
- Modify existing program/client
 - Invoke fuzzer at appropriate point
- Use fuzzing framework
 - e.g. Peach automates generating COM interface fuzzers



Bug Detection

- See if program crashed
 - Type of crash can tell a lot (SEGV vs. assert fail)
- Run program under dynamic memory error detector (valgrind/purify)
 - Catch more bugs, but more expensive per run.
- See if program locks up
- Write your own checker: e.g. valgrind skins



Workflow Automation

- Sulley, Peach, Mu-4000
 - Provide tools to aid setup, running, recording, etc.
- Virtual machines: help create reproducible workload



sulley



vmware

How Much Fuzzing Is Enough?

- Mutation based fuzzers may generate an infinite number of test cases... When has the fuzzer run long enough?
- Generation based fuzzers may generate a finite number of test cases. What happens when they're all run and no bugs are found?

Code Coverage

- Some of the answers to these questions lie in *code coverage*
- Code coverage is a metric which can be used to determine how much code has been executed.
- Data can be obtained using a variety of profiling tools. e.g. gcov

Line Coverage

Line/block coverage: Measures how many lines of source code have been executed.

For the code on the right, how many test cases (values of pair (a,b)) needed for full(100%) line coverage?

```
if ( a > 2 )  
    a = 2;  
if ( b > 2 )  
    b = 2;
```

Branch Coverage

Branch coverage: Measures how many branches in code have been taken (conditional jumps)

```
if ( a > 2 )  
    a = 2;  
if ( b > 2 )  
    b = 2;
```

For the code on the right, how many test cases needed for full branch coverage?

Path Coverage

Path coverage: Measures how many paths have been taken.

```
if( a > 2 )  
    a = 2;  
if( b > 2 )  
    b = 2;
```

For the code on the right, how many test cases needed for full path coverage?

Code Coverage

- Benefits:

- How good is this initial file?

- Am I getting stuck somewhere?

```
if(packet[0x10] < 7) { //hot path
```

```
} else { //cold path
```

```
}
```

- How good is fuzzer X vs. fuzzer Y

- Am I getting benefits from running a different fuzzer?

Problems of code coverage

- **For:**

```
mySafeCpy(char *dst, char* src){  
    if(dst && src)  
        strcpy(dst, src);  
}
```
- Does full line coverage guarantee finding the bug?
 - Yes
 - No

Problems of code coverage

- For:

```
mySafeCpy(char *dst, char* src){  
    if(dst && src)  
        strcpy(dst, src);  
}
```
- Does full line coverage guarantee finding the bug?
 - Yes ○ No
- Does full branch coverage guarantee finding the bug?
 - Yes ○ No

Fuzzing Rules of Thumb

- Protocol specific knowledge very helpful
 - Generational tends to beat random, better spec' s make better fuzzers
- More fuzzers is better
 - Each implementation will vary, different fuzzers find different bugs
- The longer you run, the more bugs you may find
- Best results come from guiding the process
 - Notice where your getting stuck, use profiling!
- Code coverage can be very useful for guiding the process: AFL
- Can we do better?

Symbolic Execution (Next Lecture)