title = { Formal Methods For Concrete Security Proofs },
    author = {Daubignard, Marion},
    month = {Jan},
    year = {2012},
    pages = {173},
    school = {Grenoble University},
    team = {DCS},
    abstract = {In this thesis, we address the lack of formalisms to carry out concrete security proofs. Our contributions are threefold. First, we present a logic, named Computational Indistinguishability Logic (CIL), for reasoning about cryptographic systems. It consists in a small set of rules capturing reasoning principles common to many proofs. Their formalization relies on classic tools such as bisimulation relations and contexts. Second, and in order to increase proof automation, it presents a Hoare logic dedicated to asymmetric encryption schemes in the Random Oracle Model that yields an automated and sound verification method. It has been successfully applied to existing encryption schemes. Third, it presents a general reduction theorem for proving indifferentiability of iterative hash constructions from a random oracle. The theorem is proven in CIL demonstrating the usefulness of the logic and has been applied to constructions such as the SHA-3 candidate Keccak and the Chop-MD construction.},


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