

DCS DAYS

FORMAL METHODS AND SOFTWARE (LEGAL) LIABILITY:

**A formal approach to build systems that
generate digital evidence**

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Outline

- About me
- Project LISE
- Objective
- Study case
- Challenges
 - Specification
 - Analysis
- Approach

About me

- Master's degree in Computer Science – Brazil, 2008
 - Malware detection using data mining techniques
- Internship at INRIA – Grenoble, June 2008
 - SIMple – language to help to define privacy policies.
 - Automate privacy policy manipulation
- PhD at VERIMAG – Grenoble, Nov. 2008
 - Project LISE


LISE: Liability Issues in Software Engineering

- Context
 - **Responsibility**
 - With system more complex is important to know who is responsible
 - Example: system that use open-source or third party components
 - **Digital evidences**
 - What can be legally used as digital evidence? How to formalize it?
 - **Contract** made between legal parts
 - The main object of LISE
 - it should contains agreements about **responsibility** and **digital evidences**

Specific objective for VERIMAG


- Propose a language for formally describe the **responsibility** of legal parts in contracts
- Formal specification of **log** as digital evidence
- Create a **Log Analyzer**, to determine the responsibility, based on the log, when a dysfunction occurs
- Approach:
 - System composed with actors
 - Log: communication registry between actors
 - The log can never be corrupted – the information registered corresponds exactly what it happened

Approach



Study case

- Signature system in mobile



- Examples of problems:
 - User alleges that he has never signed any document
 - User alleges that he has signed document by the signature is not in server

Challenges - Specification

- Formal specification of:
 - responsibility
 - how to formally define responsibility?
 - how to formalize responsibility with so many different situations? Example: casual responsibility
 - dysfunction
 - how define dysfunctions and make the link with its responsible actors
 - log (and log properties)
 - completeness – logs should contain all information necessary to establish the responsibility
 - minimality – logs should contain the minimum information possible without loose the completeness

Challenges - Analysis

- Trace Analyzer
 - Procedure to determine responsibilities
 - Production of digital evidence
- Distributed registered log
 - each actor has its own log
- Partial concrete log
 - log always has a limited size
 - not all actors can be logged
 - hardware
 - protected software

Approach

- Functional model
 - General specification of the system using the B formal language
 - Actors (User, Mobile, Server, ...)
 - Events (Server send document to mobile application, ...)
 - Trace (server_log, mobile_log, ...)
 - Automatic generation of the log based on communication between actors
- Global dysfunction
 - **Collusion** – the application do not ask the PIN and send the document direct to chip
 - **Independent dysfunctions** – mobile shows a different document and the user agree but enter a incorrect PIN
 - **Complementary dysfunctions** – the user accept and put the correct PIN, but the application do not send the user the message that the PIN was incorrect

Study case – B model

Communication

/ Application sends Document to Mobile */*

APP_PASS_DOC =

SELECT

app_state = AppNormal &
app_message = **TRUE** &

THEN

/ state change */*

app_state := WaitingResponseMobile ||

app_message := **FALSE** ||

/ send Document */*

mobile_message := **TRUE** ||

mobile_input := app_input ||

END;

Pre-condition

Communication

Study case – B model

Communication with trace

/ Application sends Document to Mobile */*

APP_PASS_DOC =

SELECT

```
app_state = AppNormal &  
app_message = TRUE &  
app_trace_number < (MAXINT - 1)
```

THEN

```
/* state change */  
app_state := WaitingResponseMobile ||  
app_message := FALSE ||  
/* send Document */  
mobile_message := TRUE ||  
mobile_input := app_input ||
```

```
/* log */  
app_log := app_log <+  
{app_log_number |-> (Receive, Server, App, app_input),  
app_log_number + 1 |-> (Send, App, Mobile, app_input)} ||  
app_log_number := app_log_number + 2
```

END;

Pre-condition

Communication

Trace

Tools

- Objective
 - create tools graphically visualize:
 - responsible actors
 - digital evidence creation process
- Graphic Animation
 - System events
 - illustrates the how the system works and when communication is passed between actors
 - System states
 - visualization of the system variable through the events of the system as graphs

AllowErrors=TRUE

AllowErrors=FALSE


initialise_machine(ServerNormal,FALSE,Document,{},1,AppNormal,

server_state=ServerNormal,server_input=Document,server_log={},
server_log_number=1,app_state=AppNormal,app_input=Document,
app_log={},app_log_number=1,mobile_state=MobileNormal,
mobile_input=Document,mobile_log={},mobile_log_number=1,
chip_state=ChipNormal,chip_input={},chip_log={},
chip_log_number=1

SERVER_SEND_DOC

server_state=WaitingResponseApp,server_input=Document,server_log={{{{{{<Se
server_log_number=2,app_state=AppNormal,app_mes
app_input=Document,app_log={},app_log_number=
mobile_state=MobileNormal,mobile_input=Document,mobil
mobile_log_number=1,chip_state=ChipNormal,chip_inp
chip_log={},chip_log_number=1

```
(
  (mobile_message = TRUE & image = 8) or
  (app_message = TRUE & app_state = WaitingResponseMobile & in
  (app_message = TRUE & app_state = WaitingPINMobile & image =
);
ArrowsAppChip ==
(
  (chip_message = TRUE & image = 10) or
  (app_message = TRUE & app_state = WaitingSignatureChip & ima
);
ArrowsMobileMobile ==
(
  (mobile_message = FALSE & (mobile_state = WaitingResponseUse
state = WaitingPINUser) & image = 25) or
  (mobile_state : {WaitingPINAsk, MobileNormal} & app_
UE & app_input : {Yes, No}) or
  (mobile_state = WaitingConfirmationApp & app_message
p_input : {WrongPIN, RightPIN})
);
```



Enabled Operations	
APP_PASS_DOC BACKTRACK	SERVER_SEND_DO initialise_machine(S setup_constants(F

Custom Animation

Slide Transition

Utiliser des ordres partiels pour modéliser, vérifier et superviser des systèmes parallèles et répartis

- Thomas Gazagnaire – PhD thesis, 2008
- **Supervision** – to help interpretations of logs with great amount of information
 - with total observation
 - with partial observation - not every event is possible to be observable
 - techniques based on deductions
- **Diagnostic**
 - technique to, from the model and observation, build possible compatible explanations
- **Events correlation**
 - Based on diagnostic results make conclusions about non observable events

Thank you

Questions?
Suggestions?
Comments?